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Abstract
The question of how judgments of explanatory value (should) in-
form probabilistic inference is well studied within psychology and
philosophy. Less studied are the questions: How does probabilis-
tic information affect judgments of explanatory value? Does prob-
abilistic information take precedence over causal information in de-
termining explanatory judgments? To answer these questions, we
conducted two experimental studies. In Study 1, we found that
probabilistic information had a negligible impact on explanatory
judgments of event-types with a potentially unlimited number of
available, alternative explanations; causal credibility was the main
determinant of explanatory value. In Study 2, we found that, for
event-token explanations with a definite set of candidate alternatives,
probabilistic information strongly affected judgments of explanatory
value. In the light of these findings, we reassess under which circum-
stances explanatory inference is probabilistically sound.
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1 Introduction
Giving explanations and reasoning with them play crucial roles in hu-
man cognition. Explanatory considerations are essential for abduction, a
mode of reasoning where a hypothesis is inferred based on its power to
explain a given body of evidence (Peirce 1931-1935; Harman 1965; Joseph-
son and Josephson 1996; Magnani 2001; Thagard 2007; Douven 2011).
Good explanations guide scientific reasoning, inform probabilistic infer-
ence, and produce a sense of understanding (e.g., Van Fraassen 1980; Keil
and Wilson 2000; Lipton 2004; De Regt and Dieks 2005; Keil 2006; Strevens
2008). Explanatory factors can also constrain causal learning and inference
(Halpern and Pearl 2001; Woodward 2003; Lombrozo 2011, 2012).
Despite this impressive body of research, little is known about what
determines the explanatory value of a given hypothesis. Lipton (2004)
associates explanatory value with causality, and suggests that explanatory
value guides probabilistic inference in both everyday and scientific contexts
(see also Okasha 2000; Weisberg 2009; Henderson 2014). Psychological ev-
idence is consistent with Lipton’s suggestion, indicating that explanatory
considerations, such as simplicity and coherence, can boost an explana-
tion’s perceived probability (Thagard 1989; Koehler 1991; Sloman 1994;
Lombrozo 2007). Lipton, however, does not clarify whether probabilistic
information (should) affect explanatory value; and available psychological
evidence does not address this issue either.
Several philosophers have appealed to probabilistic considerations to
characterise the nature and quality of an explanation. This is first touched
upon in Carl G. Hempel (1965)’s inductive-statistical model of explana-
tion, Peter Railton (1979)’s account of probabilistic explanation, and Wes-
ley Salmon (1971/84)’s statistical-relevance model. In these models of ex-
planation, the hypothesis that does the explaining (the explanans) ought to
be statistically relevant for the phenomenon to be explained (the explanan-
dum). More recently, inspired by work of Popper (1934/2002) and Good
(1960), McGrew (2003), Schupbach and Sprenger (2011), and Crupi and
Tentori (2012) developed probabilistic measures of explanatory power and
used them to compare the quality of statistical explanations (e.g., Schup-
bach 2011a,b). Similar work has been carried out by Halpern and Pearl
(2001), who used structural equations to define causal explanation, and
probability to define a measure of explanatory power.
Although the impact of probabilistic information on explanatory value
is often considered as secondary to the impact of other factors such as
causal-mechanistic information (e.g., Lewis 1986), explanatory judgment
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plausibly taps into distinct sources of information, including causal and
probabilistic information (Lombrozo 2012). Anticipating this idea, Wesley
Salmon characterized scientific explanation as “a two-tiered structure con-
sisting of statistical relevance relations on one level and causal processes
and interactions on the other” (Salmon 1997, 475–476). From this per-
spective, explanatory value depends on the joint contribution of statistical
relevance and causality, which has also been stressed in the literature on
probabilistic causation (for a survey, see Hitchcock 2010).
The present paper tests Salmon’s hypothesis: it investigates whether
and under which circumstances judgments of explanatory value are asso-
ciated with probabilistic and causal characteristics of the potential expla-
nation. A similar methodology has been applied for studying the extent
to which confirmation judgments are determined by probabilistic infor-
mation (Tentori et al. 2007a,b).
We conducted two experimental studies. In both studies, participants
read vignettes where we provided statistical and causal information about
the relation between an explanandum and a potential explanatory hypoth-
esis. Participants were asked to judge the quality of the putative expla-
nations and to judge along related cognitive dimensions, such as causal
relevance, plausibility, and degree of confirmation.
In the first study, we examined generic explanations of event-types in
vignettes where alternative explanations could easily come to mind. We
tested three hypotheses:
(1A) that judgments of explanatory value were reliably predicted by the
prior subjective credibility of the candidate explanation;
(1B) that judgments of explanatory power were sensitive to the causal
priming of the vignettes;
(1C) that judgments of explanatory value were predicted by the degree of
statistical relevance of the putative explanans for the explanandum.
In the second study, we examined singular explanations for event-
tokens in vignettes where exactly one alternative explanation was pro-
vided and no other alternative explanation could easily come to mind. We
tested three hypotheses:
(2A) that judgments of explanatory value could be dissociated from pos-
terior probability or other indicators of the rational acceptability of
the putative explanans;
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(2B) that judgments of explanatory value were positively associated with
the perceived causal and cognitive salience of the target hypothesis;
(2C) that judgments of explanatory value were positively affected by sta-
tistical relevance.
Results from the first study showed that for generic explanations of event-
types, prior credibility of the hypothesis and causal priming both raised
the explanatory value of the hypothesis. Statistical relevance relations had
a negligible impact on explanatory value, yielding to causal credibility as
the main determinant of explanatory value. Results from the second study
provided evidence that for explanations of singular events, judgments of ex-
planatory value were highly sensitive to relations of statistical relevance,
and were dissociable from posterior probabilities and other indicators of
the rational acceptability of the explanatory hypothesis.
In sum, all above hypotheses, apart from (1C), were confirmed by our
results.
Collectively, these findings support the hypothesis that explanation is
a complex structure that taps into distinct types of sources of informa-
tion in different contexts. Specifically, our findings indicate that two dif-
ferent kinds of probabilistic cues—the credibility of the explanation and
the statistical relevance for the explanandum–—contribute to explanatory
value, albeit in different circumstances. The level of generality of the ex-
planation (and the explanandum) makes a crucial difference: For generic
(type) explanations, the prior credibility, but not the statistical relevance
boosts explanatory value. For singular (token) explanations, explanatory
value co-varies with statistical relevance, but not with prior credibility. In
the light of these results, attempts to find a probabilistically coherent and
descriptively adequate logic of abductive/explanatory reasoning may be
doomed, due to the radically different way that people react to probabilis-
tic cues in different contexts.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section Section 2 and
3 present our two experiments. Section 4 puts the results into a broader
perspective and discusses, inter alia, the implications for quantitative ap-
proaches to explanatory power and broader consequences for theories of
explanatory reasoning.
2 Experiment 1: Credibility and Causal Priming
The experiment was preceded by a pre-study in order to optimize stimulus
material. 33 students from Tilburg University in The Netherlands (mean
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age 28.61 years, SD = 10.74) volunteered to take part in the pre-study and
rated individually 14 empirically testable causal hypotheses with respect
to their credibility on a 5-point scale. The four lowest and highest rated
hypotheses were selected for the incredible/credible report condition of
this study.
2.1 Experiment and Methods
Our first experiment was conducted online, using the Amazon Mechanical
Turk (MTurk, www.mturk.com). Instructions and material were presented
in English language.
Participants
Two hundred thirty-seven participants (mean age 31.86 years; SD = 10.41;
144 male, 161 native speakers of English and 76 speakers of other lan-
guages) completed Experiment 1 for a small monetary payment.
Design and Material
Eight short reports about fictitious research studies on different topics
were created, using LimeSurvey 1.85 to run the online experiment via
MTurk, and to record the data. Presentation order of the short reports
was randomized for each participant.
Each report described a fictitious research study, where a “treatment
group” (explanans present) and a “control group” (explanans absent) were
contrasted. Information about the statistical relevance of the explanans on
the explanandum was provided. The reports varied in the use of explicit
causal language. Here is an example:
Drinking coffee causes high blood pressure
A recent study by German researchers investigated the link be-
tween drinking coffee and high blood pressure. The researchers stud-
ied 887 people, aged between 18 and 64. Among the participants who
drank several cups of coffee a day, 48% exhibited high blood pressure.
Instead, among the participants who did not drink several cups of
coffee a day, only 13% exhibited high blood pressure. Factors such as
age, daily alcohol consumption, and professional status, which were
controlled by the researchers, could not explain these results. The
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study therefore supports the hypothesis that drinking several cups of
coffee a day causes high blood pressure.
The vignette was, in a within-subjects design, varied in three dimen-
sions, corresponding to three independent variables. Table 1 provides an
overview of the hypotheses used in the experiment and the exact phrasing
we used.
IV 1: Credibility The credibility of an hypothesis, with the two levels “in-
credible” and “credible”.
IV 2: Causal Priming The phrasing of the hypotheses, with the condition
“on”, using the wording “X causes Y”, and the condition “off”, with
the wording “X is associated with Y”.
IV 3: Statistical Relevance The relative frequency of the explanandum,
given absence and presence of the putative explanans. There were
two conditions: “big difference” (e.g., 48% vs. 13%) and “small dif-
ference” (e.g., 25% vs. 22%).
The experiment was based on a 2 × 2 × 2 = 8 within-subject design,
with the factors Credability (credible, incredible), Causal Priming (on, off),
and Statistical Relevance (big, small). The allocation of causal and non-
causal frames and the allocation of small and big effect size to the individ-
ual reports was counter-balanced across the participants.
Procedure
Participants were asked to carefully assess each report along four dimen-
sions (construct names were not revealed to the participants):
Causal Relevance “There is a causal relation between X [the explanans of
the respective hypothesis] and Y.”
Plausibility “The hypothesis is plausible, given the results of the study.”
Confirmation “This study provides strong evidence for the hypothesis.”
Explanatory Power “The hypothesis investigated by the researchers is a
good explanation of the results of this study.”
The choice of these four items was motivated by the crucial role that
these constructs play in abductive reasoning, according to different ac-
counts of explanation (Halpern and Pearl 2001; Woodward 2003; Lipton
6
2004). Participants’ judgments were collected using a 7-point scale with
the extremes (1) “I strongly disagree” and (7) “I strongly agree”. An “I
don’t know” option could also be selected.
Hypotheses presented in the vignettes of Experiment 2
INCREDIBLE CREDIBLE
Exercising is associated
with/causes frequent headache
Consuming anabolic steroids is
associated with/causes physical
strength
Attending religious services is
associated with/causes better
health
Smoking cannabis is associated
with/causes drowsiness
Eating pizza is associated
with/causes immunity to flu
Having breakfast is associated
with/causes a healthy body mass
index
Sex without condom is associ-
ated with/causes female well-
being
Drinking coffee is associated
with / causes high blood pres-
sure
Table 1: The hypotheses of Experiment 1, ordered according to credibility, for
both types of causal framing (off: “X is associated with Y”; on:“X causes Y”).
2.2 Results
The participants’ ratings were submitted to an ANOVA with the factors
Credibility (incredible, credible), Causal Priming (off, on), Statistical Rel-
evance (small, big), and Construct (Causal Relevance, Plausibility, Confir-
mation, Explanatory Power).
ANOVA revealed main effects of Credibility (F(1, 236) = 121.728; p <
.001; η2part = .340), Causal Priming (F(1, 236) = 65.184; p < .001; η
2
part =
.216), and Construct (F(3, 234) = 6.98; p < .001; η2part = .029). We also
observed interactions between Credibility × Causal Priming (F(1, 236) =
14.265; p < .001; η2part = .057) and Credibility × Construct (F(3, 234) =
5.74; p = .001; η2part = .024). The interaction between Credibility and
Statistical Relevance was marginally significant (F(1, 236) = 3.461; p = .64;
η2part = .014). There was no main effect of Statistical Relevance (p > .25),
nor any three-or four-way-interaction (all p’s > .35).
Pairwise comparisons showed that incredible reports were rated signif-
icantly lower than credible reports, whether causally primed or not (prim-
ing off: t(236) = −8.92; p < .001; priming on: t(236) = −10.67; p < .001).
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Credibility
Causal Priming Incredible Credible
Off M = 3.87 (.12) M = 4.74 (.92)
On M = 4.14 (.12) M = 5.32 (.78)
Statistical Relevance
Small M = 4.07 (.12) M = 5.03 (.008)
Big M = 3.94 (.12) M = 5.08 (.08)
Table 2: Marginal means and SE of the participants’ ratings as a function of
Credibility and Causal Priming, and Credibility and Statistical Relevance. Stan-
dard Error is given in parentheses.
Credibility
Construct Incredible Credible
Causal Relevance M = 4.10 (.12) M = 4.97 (.94)
Confirmation M = 3.84 (.12) M = 5.02 (.86)
Plausibility M = 4.42 (.12) M = 5.15 (.78)
Explanatory Power M = 3.95 (.12) M = 5.08 (.78)
Table 3: Marginal means and SE of the four response variables (Causal Rele-
vance, Confirmation, Plausibility, Explanatory Power) as a function of Credibility
(N=236).
Causally primed reports, whether credible or incredible, were rated higher
than causally non-primed reports (incredible: t(236) = −4.047; p < .001;
credible: t(236) = −7.818; p < .001). Pairwise comparisons also showed
that incredible reports were rated significantly lower than credible re-
ports, whether statistical relevance was small or big (small relevance:
t(236) = −8.92; p < .001; big relevance: t(236) = −10.922; p < .001).
See Table 2 for the descriptives. Finally, for each construct (Plausibility
etc.), incredible reports were rated significantly lower than credible reports
(Plausibility: t(236) = −9.579; p < .001; Confirmation: t(236) = −10.63;
p < .001; Explanatory Power: t(236) = −10.976; p < .001; and Causal
Relevance: t(236) = −8.19; p < .001). See Table 3 for the descriptives.
These results demonstrate that credibility interacts with the other fac-
tors that were manipulated in the experiment. For each of the constructs,
credible reports were consistently rated higher than incredible reports,
with the ratings further modulated by the other factors. In order to ex-
plicitly assess how the credibility of the reports influenced participants’
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understanding of the four different constructs, we examined the correla-
tions between the constructs, separately for both levels of Credibility. The
results are summarized in table 4.
Incredible Credible
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1. Causal Relevance — .71–.82 .69–.79 .72–.74 — .53–.60 .58–.65 .47–.57
2. Plausibility — .77–.82 .70–.76 — .55–.67 .61–.67
3. Confirmation — .76–.84 — .61–.67
4. Explanatory Power — —
Table 4: Zero-order correlations for 4 items in the incredible report condition
(N = 237, left table) and the credible report condition (N = 237, right table). All
correlations were significant with p < .001.
Correlations between the constructs were very high for incredible re-
ports. They ranged from .69 to .84 while for credible report, the corre-
lations were lower, ranging from .47 to .67. This indicates that the cor-
relations between the constructs, and thus the perceived similarity and
dissimilarity of the four constructs, was modulated by the experimental
manipulation and especially by the credibility of the reports. Participants
treated the four dependent variables (constructs) more similarly for in-
credible than for credible hypotheses. This shows that participants only
distinguished between cognitive virtues of a hypothesis when a basic level
of credibility was achieved.
3 Experiment 2: Explanatory Power
3.1 Experiment and Methods
Our second experiment consisted of an online questionnaire, conducted
via the LimeSurvey environment. The participants for our study were un-
dergraduate students of Tilburg University from the School of Economics
and Management and the School of Social and Behavioral Sciences. They
were recruited via emails from a teacher of one of their classes. Incentives
were provided in terms of points for the final exam and a prize lottery.
The respondents of the survey were 744 students, of which 671 com-
pleted the questionnaire (383 male, Mage = 21.5 (SD = 2.3)). They were
randomly assigned to one of the 12 versions of an experimental vignette.
Each participant received exactly one vignette.
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Design and Material
Participants were presented with an experimental vignette where two pos-
sible events were related to two possible explanations for that event:
Vignette 1: There are two urns on the table. Urn A contains 67%
white and 33% black balls, Urn B contains only white balls. One
of these urns is selected. You don’t know which urn is selected, but
you know that the chance that Urn A is selected is 25%, and that the
chance that Urn B is selected is 75%. From the selected urn a white
ball is taken at random.
Please now consider the hypothesis that Urn A has been chosen.
The participants were then asked to assess the following seven items (the
construct names in italics were not provided to the participants) on a Likert
scale ranking from 1 (“do not agree at all”) to 7 (“fully agree”):
Logical Implication The hypothesis logically implies that a white ball has
been taken out.
Causal Relevance The hypothesis specifies the cause that a white ball has
been taken out.
Confirmation The hypothesis is confirmed by a white ball has been taken
out.
Posterior Probability The hypothesis is probable given that a white ball
has been taken out.
Explanatory Power The hypothesis explains that a white ball has been
taken out.
Understanding The hypothesis provides understanding why a white ball
has been taken out.
Truth The hypothesis is true.
The choice of these seven items was motivated by the crucial role that
concepts such as logical implication, causality and confirmation play in
reasoning about candidate explanations, according to different philosoph-
ical accounts of explanatory value (Hempel 1965; Salmon 1997; Woodward
2003; Schupbach and Sprenger 2011).
After filling in this questionnaire, the participants could explain the
way they made their judgments, and we collected some demographic data.
This vignette was, in a between-subjects design, varied in two dimen-
sions, corresponding to two independent variables:
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IV 1: Statistical Relevance The degree of statistical relevance between the
explanans and the explanandum, with four values ranging from
“strong disconfirm” to “strong confirm”.
IV 2: Prior Probability The prior probability of the hypothesis under con-
sideration (.25, .5, or .75).
All possible 4 × 3 = 12 combinations of the values of these variables
were realized in the experiment. Statistical relevance was manipulated
by changing the color of the ball drawn from the urn or by changing the
explanatory hypothesis (from Urn A to Urn B).
To increase the ecological validity of our experiments, we also set up
two other vignettes that are closer to cases of ordinary reasoning, and
repeated the experiment for these vignettes. See Appendix.
Procedure
Participants completed the questionnaire on a university PC or their own
computer in the digital environment of LimeSurvey installed on a local
server. The use of LimeSurvey guaranteed that the data could be protected
and provided with a time stamp and information about the IP address of
the respondent. The experiment was self-paced and took approximately
10 minutes to complete. In total, the experiment thus contained 36 cells,
corresponding to twelve different combinations of the values of the inde-
pendent variables times three different scenarios.
3.2 Results
Prior to the analysis of the effects of vignette manipulation, we explored
the interdependencies of the seven items in the response questionnaire. To
recall, the participants were asked to judge several aspects of the hypoth-
esis with respect to the evidence: logical implication, causal relevance, ex-
planatory power, increase in understanding, confirmation, posterior prob-
ability and truth. By analyzing the interdependencies with the help of
the Pearson zero-order correlation coefficient, we determined whether the
participants clearly separated these seven concepts, or whether some of
them could be identified with each other.
The correlations are presented in Table 5. The analysis revealed that all
of the variables correlated at least with .3 with several other variables, but
at most .63. These medium-sized correlations show that the participants
distinguish the seven concepts from each other and do not conflate cognate
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. Logical Implication - .38 .22 .32 .46 .30 .12
2. Causal Relevance - .45 .39 .56 .63 .37
3. Confirmation - .56 .35 .47 .63
4. Post Probability - .37 .51 .46
5. Explanatory Power - .60 .28
6. Understanding - .36
7. Truth -
Table 5: Zero-order correlations for 7 items (N = 671), all correlations with p <
.01.
concepts (e.g., causal relevance, explanatory power) with each other, which
would be reflected in correlation coefficients of greater than .7. At the
same time, the response variables were sufficiently related to each other to
motivate a Principal Component Analysis: that is, a decomposition of the
seven response variables into 2-4 constructs that explain together most of
the variation in the data.
Principal Component Analysis
The factorability of the 7 items was examined with a Principle Compo-
nent Analysis (PCA). The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling ade-
quacy was .82 and the Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant (χ2(21)
= 1790.77, p < .0001). The initial eigenvalues showed 51% of variance ex-
plained by the first factor, 16% explained by the second factor, and 10% ex-
plained by the third factor. A visual inspection of the scree plot revealed a
’leveling off’ of eigenvalues after the three factors, therefore, a three factor
solution using the oblique rotation was conducted, with the three factors
explaining 77% of the variance. All items had primary loadings over .7,
viz. Table 6, which presents the factor loading matrix (loadings under .30
suppressed). In the remainder, we will restrict our analysis to these three
factors.
The names for these factors are derived from the clustering that Table
6 indicates. Factor 1, Cognitive Salience, clusters explanatory power to-
gether with cognitive values that are often seen as related, such as causal
coherence and enhancement of understanding (De Regt and Dieks 2005;
Strevens 2008). Factor 2, Rational Acceptability, captures those cognitive
values that hang together with the acceptability of a hypothesis: proba-
bility, confirmation by the evidence, and finally, truth. The strong correla-
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Cognitive
Salience
Rational
Acceptability
Entailment Communality
Logical Implication .94 .94
Causal Relevance .86 .74
Confirmation -.84 .77
Post Probability -.72 .67
Explanatory Power .81 .73
Understanding .87 .78
Truth -.88 .75
Table 6: Factor loadings and communalities based on a principle component
analysis with oblimin rotation for 7 items (N = 671).
tions between these values are not surprising: confirmation raises poste-
rior probability, which is in turn an indicator of the truth of a theory (e.g.,
Howson and Urbach 2006). Finally, Factor 3 captures the strength of the
logical relation between hypothesis and evidence. Since no other response
variable is loaded on this factor, it figures as Entailment, showing the link
to the response variable Logical Implication.1
Tests of Experimental Manipulation
We conducted two analyses of variance (ANOVAs) to test the effects of
the independent variables, Statistical Relevance and Prior Probability, on
Cognitive Salience, Rational Acceptability and Entailment, respectively.2
First, we tested the effects of the experimental manipulation on Cog-
nitive Salience. There was a significant main effect of Statistical Relevance,
F(3, 659) = 118.53, p < .001, η2 p = .35, but no effect of Prior Probability,
F(2, 659) = 0.20, p = .822. There was no interaction effect between Statis-
tical Relevance and Prior Probability, F(6, 659) = 0.12, p = .994 – see Table
1The internal consistency for two of the three scales (the third scale only consisted of
one item) was examined using Cronbach’s alpha, resulting in alpha .82 for Factor 1 and
.79 for Factor 2. Composite scores were calculated for each of the three factors using the
mean of the items with primary loadings on each factor. The descriptive values for the
newly constructed scales were M = 3.65, SD = 1.91 for Explanatory Value, M = 3.63, SD =
1.87 for Rational Acceptability, and M = 3.75, SD = 2.40 for Logical Implication.
2A prior analysis of the effect of the vignette on the three dependent variables revealed
that Cognitive Salience (but not Rational Acceptability and Entailment) was also affected
by the vignette manipulation. For clarity of exposition, the statistics is not included here
because the size and direction of the significant main effects and the interaction effect
remained the same when vignette was included as a factor.
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Cognitive Salience Statistical Relevance
Prior Probability Strong Disconfirm Weak Disconfirm Weak Confirm Strong Confirm
Low 2.02 (.22) 3.02 (.21) 4.72 (.20) 4.81 (.19)
Medium 1.95 (.21) 3.05 (.20) 4.66 (.21) 4.58 (.20)
High 1.88 (.24) 3.12 (.21) 4.63 (.22) 4.64 (.20)
Table 7: Estimated Marginal Means and SE of Cognitive Salience by Statistical
Relevance and Prior Probability (N = 671).
7 for the descriptives. A pair-wise comparison with Bonferroni correction
of the levels of Statistical Relevance showed a significant difference between
all levels (p < .001), with the exception of Weak and Strong Confirm.
Second, we examined the effects of the experimental manipulation on
Rational Acceptability. There was again a significant main effect of Statistical
Relevance, F(3, 659) = 223.76, p < .001, η2 p = .51, but no effect of Prior Prob-
ability, F(2, 659) = 1.68, p = .188. There was no interaction effect between
Statistical Relevance and Prior Probability, F(6, 659) = 0.81, p = .463 – see
Table 8 for the descriptives. A pair-wise comparison with Bonferroni cor-
rection of the levels of Statistical Relevance showed a significant difference
between all levels (p < .001), with the exception of Weak Disconfirmation
and Weak Confirmation (p = .005).
Finally, we analyzed the effects of the experimental manipulation on
Entailment. Similarly to the previous two dependent variables, there was
again a significant main effect of Statistical Relevance, F(3, 659) = 105.40, p
< .001, η2 p = .32, but no effect of Prior Probability, F(2, 659) = 1.23, p =
.292. There was no interaction effect between Statistical Relevance and Prior
Probability, F(6, 659) = 0.76, p = .598 – see Table 9 for the descriptives. A
pair-wise comparison with Bonferroni correction of the levels of Statistical
Relevance showed a significant difference between all degrees (p < .001)
with the exception of Weak Confirm and Weak Disconfirm (p = .007).
Since Entailment measures the impact of the hypothesis on the explanan-
dum rather than vice versa, it is logical that the order deviates from the
previous two tables, with Weak Confirm obtaining the highest score.
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Rational Acceptability Statistical Relevance
Prior Probability Strong Disconfirm Weak Disconfirm Weak Confirm Strong Confirm
Low 1.93 (.18) 2.93 (.18) 3.45 (.17) 5.39 (.16)
Medium 2.05 (.18) 3.10 (.17) 3.74 (.18) 5.62 (.17)
High 1.95 (.20) 3.20 (.18) 3.48 (.18) 5.82 (.17)
Table 8: Estimated Marginal Means and SE of Rational Acceptability by Statisti-
cal Relevance and Prior Probability (N = 671).
Logical Entailment Statistical Relevance
Prior Probability Strong Disconfirm Weak Disconfirm Weak Confirm Strong Confirm
Low 2.37 (.27) 2.98 (.26) 5.92 (.26) 4.14 (.25)
Medium 2.33 (.26) 3.00 (.26) 5.93 (.26) 3.69 (.26)
High 1.88 (.30) 3.09 (.27) 5.92 (.27) 3.32 (.26)
Table 9: Estimated Marginal Means and SE of Entailment by Statistical Relevance
and Prior Probability (N = 671).
4 Discussion
To investigate the impact of causal and probabilistic information on ex-
planatory judgment, we conducted two experiments where participants
were presented with fictitious vignettes and asked to rate a given hypoth-
esis along various dimensions, e.g., its explanatory value, its plausibility,
its causal saliency, the sense of understanding it confers, etc.
In the first experiment, participants were presented with hypotheses
that could causally explain familiar types of phenomena (e.g., “eating
pizza causes/is associated with immunity to flu” vs. “consuming anabolic
steroids is causes/associated with physical strength”). Explanations dif-
fered in their degree of subjective prior credibility, and were presented in
the form of research reports. The reports also differed in the explicit use
of causal language as well as in the degree of statistical relevance between
explanans and explanandum.
We found that manipulations of statistical relevance did not affect par-
ticipants’ judgments, but the plausibility of the causal mechanism did have
a strong effect on their judgments. This result indicates that the plausibil-
ity of a candidate explanation matters for generic, event-type explanations.
In such contexts, the plausibility of the causal mechanism overrides con-
siderations of statistical relevance. We also observed an interaction effect
between causal priming and prior plausibility: causal priming was the
more effective the more credible the candidate explanation was. For a
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credible causal hypothesis, the explicit use of causal language led to a
much more coherent (and explanatorily valuable) picture than for an im-
plausible causal hypothesis. Both main effects and the interaction effect
underline the importance of causal information for generic explanatory
judgments.
In the second experiment, participants were asked to judge token-
explanations of singular events. We observed a clear distinction between
judgments of explanatory value and (objective) posterior probabilities.
More generally, participants’ judgments on the seven response variables
were aligned along three dimensions: Cognitive Salience (primarily loaded
with the response variables Causality, Explanatory Value and Understand-
ing), Rational Acceptability (Posterior Probability, Confirmation and Truth)
and Entailment (Logical Implication). On the one hand, this finding sub-
stantiates the conjecture from previous literature about the existence of a
tight connection between explanatory value, causality and a sense of un-
derstanding (Lipton 2004; Keil 2006; Lombrozo 2007; Trout 2007). On the
other hand, it indicates that folk reasoning about potential explanations
can neatly distinguish between the concepts of Rational Acceptability and
Cognitive Salience of a hypothesis, as we hypothesized.
Participants’ judgments on the three main factors we identified—
Cognitive Salience, Rational Acceptability, and Logical Implication—were
strongly affected by changes in statistical relevance, specifically by manip-
ulations of the likelihood of the target hypothesis. Instead, the prior prob-
abilities of the candidate explanatory hypothesis, presented as objective
base rates, affected participants’ judgments in none of those three factors.
These results demonstrate that in situations where causal detail is kept
sparse and the explanandum corresponds to a singular token-event, ex-
planatory judgment is heavily affected by information about probabilistic
relations between hypothesis and evidence.
Overall, the results of our two study indicate that explanatory judg-
ment is, as Lombrozo (2012, 270) reports, a complex psychological phe-
nomenon intertwined with probabilistic and causal reasoning. Specif-
ically, our results demonstrate that two different kinds of probabilistic
information—the prior credibility of the explanation and the statistical
relevance for the explanandum—contribute to explanatory value, albeit
in different circumstances. The level of generality of the explanation (and
the explanandum) make a crucial difference: for generic (type) explana-
tions, the prior credibility of the explanatory hypothesis, but not its statis-
tical relevance on the explanandum boosts explanatory value, whereas for
singular (token) explanations, explanatory value co-varies with statistical
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relevance, but not with the prior credibility of the explanatory hypothesis.
While these findings confirm and refine conjectures made in the
theoretical literature on explanation (Salmon 1984), they call for a re-
assessment of the rationality of abduction (e.g., Okasha 2000; Lipton 2004):
when explanatory value is insensitive to the prior credibility of the ex-
planans, abductive inference will not track posterior probabilities and
may lead to probabilistically incoherent judgments. Logics of abduc-
tive/explanatory inference that have ambitions to be descriptively ade-
quate need to take into account the context-sensitivity of people’s ex-
planatory reasoning. Pluralism about the nature of explanatory reasoning
may become more attractive as a result.
The result also demonstrate the fruitfulness of recent theoretical work
that explicates explanatory power in probabilistic terms (Schupbach and
Sprenger 2011; Crupi and Tentori 2012). Finally, discovering the hitherto
unknown difference between singular and generic explanatory reasoning
opens the way for further work on matching explanatory with causal and
probabilistic reasoning (e.g., regarding the analogous difference between
generic and singular causation).
We hope that our contribution will stimulate further research on the
nature of explanation. In particular, we hope that our results will help
to promote “the prospects for a naturalized philosophy of explanation”
(Lombrozo 2011, 549), where philosophical theorizing about the nature of
explanation is constrained and informed by empirical evidence about the
psychology of explanatory value.
Experimental Material for Experiment 2
Apart from Vignette 1 (the urn scenario), we used the following vignettes
and varied them in the dimensions of Statistical Relevance and Prior Prob-
ability:
Vignette 2: Again and again, Ruud has knee problems when playing
football. The doctors give him two options: knee surgery or a conser-
vative treatment. If Ruud chooses to go into surgery, he cannot play
football for half a year; if he chooses the conservative treatment, there
is a 33% chance that he can play again after one month; otherwise
(with a chance of 67%) he has to rest longer. You don’t know which
option Ruud chooses, but you believe that the chance that he chooses
surgery is 75%—and that the chance that he chooses the conservative
treatment is 25%. A month later a joint friend tells you that Ruud is
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still unable to play football.
Please now consider the hypothesis that Ruud has chosen for the con-
servative treatment.
Vignette 3: Louise arrives by train in Twin City. Twin city has two
districts: West Bank and East Bank. In West Bank, there is only one
taxi company, namely Green Taxi Ltd., and all their cabs are green.
Green Taxi Ltd. also owns 67% of all cabs in East Bank. The other
cabs in East Bank are owned by The Red Taxi Inc., all their cabs are
red. Louise does not know which part of the city the train is entering,
but judging from her knowledge of Twin City she assumes that there
is a 75% chance that she is in West Bank (and a chance of 25% that
she is in East Bank). At some point, Louise sees a green cab from the
train.
Please now consider the hypothesis that Louise is in East Bank.
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